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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent evidence from the microfinance industry reveals  increases in sources of funding 
which  anecdotally links to the profits of institutions. This phenomenon has evoked 
concerns for the responsiveness of the poor to credit market operational policies such as  
loan pricing. This paper integrates the poor’s characteristics into a loan size equation to 
estimate influence on interest rate stimulus. Using data from Ghana, we test the 
hypothesis of loan price inelasticity using quantile regression and the interaction 
procedure. The quantile regression shows pronounced variations in responsiveness of 
loan size to interest rate changes at different percentiles. In contrast to an inverse 
relationship depicted between the 20th and 40th quantiles, we observe positive and fairly 
flat curvatures at the extremes and around the median. Motivated by this finding, the 
interaction procedure is employed for household poverty scores and lending rates at 
varied statistic to identify differences in clients’ responsiveness. The semi-elasticity of 
loan amount responsiveness to a unit change in interest rate is more than proportionate 
and significant for the poorest group. In a broader context, the need for market 
segmentation based on socio-economic well-being is suggested in the paper in pursuance 
of the ‘win-win’ objective of poverty reduction and financial sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the provocative questions in the microfinance sector is on its relatively high 
interest rates. Although, the studies have revealed wide interest rate variation of at least 
50 per cent between formal financial institutions and moneylenders, (Armendariz de 
Aghion, and Morduch, 2005) . the spatial and other institutional differences in interest 
rates have led to sustained concern on the price of loan in the microfinance sector. 
Rosenberg et al. (2009) estimates an average interest rate yield of 30 per cent and 
conclude that microfinance lending rates are not usurious. However, country specific 
high interest rates of 80 per cent annum evidenced in Mexico and South Africa engender 
concerns on who is paying what, effect on average returns and client’s responsiveness. In 
a related argument, Paranjape (2008) questions microfinance institutions’ interest rate 
rigidity in an era of low and changing lending rates. In this paper, we propose an 
approach in determining levels of lending rates is an assessment of clients’ loan size 
sensitivity to interest rate changes given their socio-economic status. 
 
The drift from subsidized credit to commercial borrowing, mostly by the famous  
Mckinnion and Shaw hypothesis1, demands a response on how the poor borrower’s 
average returns is affected. However, identifying the impact of subsidy removal via 
returns on borrowing rather than repayment offers a better understanding of the poor’s 
coping strategy and effect on economic activity after repayment. In this paper, we argue 
from hindsight that borrowers’ poor status moderates the relationship between interest 
rate and amount of loan take-up. The paper hypothesize that clients at the margins of 
socio-economic status are sensitive relative to the majority in the middle band which  is 
premised on the positive externality of group mechanisms in minimizing information 
asymmetry amongst the extreme poor. The policy thrust of the paper is to explore the 
much-advocated need for market segmentation in microfinance with greater emphasis on 
clients’ socio-economics status. 
  
Until recently, , microfinance operations are heavily based  on client insensitivity. The 
evidence of subsidies distorting microfinance operations and the honesty and capability 
of the poor in repaying loans underpins the ‘win-win’ rhetoric of microfinance (Morduch, 
2000). There is a higher degree of  mismatch between high demand for financial services 
and inadequate number of financial service delivery outlets (Arun and Hulme, 2003)  
Pricing of loan amount in microfinance is similar to the practice of financial institutions 
that has principally relied on the cost of funds, transaction cost and the mark-up. 
However, there are two issues which make a distinct difference in microfinance. The first 
tries to disentangle the role of subsidies that is very much present in microfinance 
operations. Microfinance practitioners aware of the effect of subsidies have either 
discounted subsidies at the outset or mitigate its effect through an exit approach over 
time. Either of these approaches is not a familiar practice in traditional banking and 
evidence of its adverse consequences in the microfinance market abound (Morduch, 
                                                 
1
  The fundamental tenet of the Mckinnon and Shaw hypothesis asserts that thorough liberalization of financial markets 
overcomes repression arising from interventions such as provision of cheap external finance and imposition of tariffs. 
“Artificially low-cost loans or subsidized credit programs may be both unnecessary and unwise” (Mckinnon, 1973; pp. 
15). 
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1999). The second feature of microfinance market deals with the high and differential 
transaction cost of the poor. High cost from the perspective of the poor’s characteristics 
and differential due to the operational mechanisms. The latter includes the use of social 
collateral to delegate screening, monitoring and enforcement of repayment in contrast to 
asset-based collateral. These differences constrain the adaptability of mainstream 
theoretical argument on interest rate and borrowing. 
 
Central to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) arguments on demand for credit, rationing and 
outcomes are the issues of information asymmetry, interest rate and collateral. . The two  
outcomes of this work - attracting risky borrowers (adverse selection) and rationing 
stumble in the case of microfinance clients. Three reasons can be identified for this: First, 
microfinance clients’ economic activities are mostly homogenous and the poor in general 
are risk averse. Secondly, the argument of client insensitivity if true weakens the 
expected link between interest rate and adverse selection. Thirdly, non-use of financial 
and physical asset-based collateral limits the options of microfinance lenders to enforce 
rationing. 
  
The implausible connection between credit market theory and microfinance practice has 
led to mixed policy alternatives in gauging interest rates in different economies. This 
includes interest rate caps, market segmentation based on economic activity, government 
direct involvement in retail financing and so forth. Most of these interventions in the past 
decade have either failed or remains at the experimental phase. The dilemma on the 
nature of relationship and gradient between interest rate and loan size still remains 
unresolved with hard evidence. The obvious way forward is to revisit the validity of the 
assumptions characterizing the poor’s perceived insensitivity to interest rate charges. This 
motivation has spurred on some empirical research on the subject matter in the immediate 
past years. Among these include; Dymski, (2003); Dehejia et al., (2005); Karlan et al., 
(2007); Briones, 2007 and Karlan and Zinman, (2008). An emerging consensus from 
these studies points to a demystification of the notion of client insensitivity. Very 
commendable, most of these studies are characterized by rigour econometric approaches. 
Econometric tools such as randomized experiments, fixed and random effects, 
instrumental variable estimation and heckman two-stage estimation are used to resolve 
potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and sample selection. 
Conspicuously missing however is client socio-economic characteristics and how 
sensitivity varies across different categories of poor borrowers. 
 
In this paper, we use quantile approach to justify the application of interaction procedure 
in least squares to estimate the poor’s sensitivity to loan price. Empirical analysis relies 
on data from Ghana which consists of both clients and non-clients sample. We further 
explore the robustness of our estimates by addressing potential problems of endogeneity 
and sample selection using traditional second stage methods of instrumental variable and 
‘heckman’ estimations. The contribution of this paper is the use of the entire sample to 
verify the poor’s sensitivity in contrast to the use of sub-samples as offered in all recent 
papers cited earlier. The estimation procedure is done as follows: in the first stage we 
estimate a quantile regression of a basic loan size equation at different percentiles to 
assess variations in responsiveness for all covariates especially interest rate; second stage 
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employs the interaction procedure for household poverty scores and lending rates at 
varied statistic to identify differences in clients’ responsiveness; finally we compare our 
results with sub-sample approach, test and correct for problems of endogeneity and 
sample selection. 
 
In contrast to least squares estimation showing a less than unitary downward change in 
loan size for a small change in interest rate, we observe a pronounced gentle downward 
slope between the 20th and 40th quantiles. Coupled with this observation are the 
respective positive and relatively flat curves at the tails and between the 40th and 65th 
quantiles. Karlan and Zinman’s (2008) inclination of the potential effect of poorer clients 
on the relationship between interest rate and loan size is empirically verified with a 
multiplicative interactive procedure. Subsequently, we show that the semi-elasticity of 
loan amount responsiveness to a unit change in interest rate is more than proportionate 
(2.4%) and significant with a statistic explaining the distribution of the poorest twenty 
percent. In a sharp contrast the coefficient of interest rate using the 50th percentile is 
price inelastic and insignificant. 
  
The next section of the paper discusses the theoretical debates and some recent empirical 
findings on the determinants and levels of interest rate and client sensitivity. It draws on 
some of the main issues indebted to interest rate fixing and relates that to arguments for 
and against a market-driven competitive microfinance industry. Macro level factors such 
as prime rate and general macroeconomic environment are perceived as exogenous to the 
focus of this paper and therefore are not discussed. This section will be followed by a 
brief description of the microfinance industry in Ghana. Sections four and five discuss the 
methods of study and results respectively. The final section concludes and identifies two 
core policy issues emerging from the discussion and analysis.  
  
2. Debates 
The analysis of Mckinnon and Shaw hypothesis sets the tone for financial sector 
deregulation in most countries. Since then, interest rate determination in formal financial 
institutions has experienced a transition from various forms of direct regulation to a 
system deregulation. The latter permits the market through the demand and supply of 
loans to determine rates. The principal justification for the turnaround is the plausibility 
of financial repression in a regulated regime. Black et al. (1997) posits that denying 
financial service providers the opportunity to charge interest rates at the market 
equilibrium leads to spiral shortages as potential lenders are sidelined due to government 
direct involvement in retail financing. Thus regulating interest rates through diverse 
means such as caps, high bank reserve and liquidity ratio requirements discourage 
innovation and diversification of loan products. 
 
This view point although strongly upheld, Levine et al. (1999) identify broad financial 
functional roles of the state2 to mitigate some lapses that emerge as a result of market 
determination of interest rate. Permitting credit markets to determine interest rate through 
the economic forces of demand and supply of loans leads to rationing as a result of 
imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue from 
                                                 
2
 This includes legal frameworks for contract enforcement and broad accounting and reporting standards. 
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the perspective of a pool of borrowers that react to interest rate and collateral set by 
banks. Riskiness of projects and attitude of borrowers constrains banks to continuously 
increase interest rates and collateral requirements even in the case of excess demand for 
loan. The obvious consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard stare in the face of 
banks. Overtime banks have developed other mechanisms to mitigate these potential 
problems. For instance during all three3 principal phases of a loan life, non-asset based 
strategies4 are employed to minimize loan default, fungibility and to stimulate and 
redirect investment to prioritized sectors of an economy. 
 
With this backdrop of information on the state of play in traditional banking system an 
open question about the applicability of this theory and practice to microfinance market 
remains unanswered. The starting point for any discussion is to acknowledge that the 
market for microfinance is a residual of the traditional banking market. The philosophy 
underpinning the emergence of microfinance was to serve the neglected market niche of 
the traditional banking system. This market niche though hard to define, in practice has 
been labelled with different names. This includes the ‘unbankable’, poor, brave poor, 
economically active poor and so forth. A plausible reason for the different labelling 
overtime is the on-going identification of a group of clients capable of responding 
favourably to banking needs and services. Operational strategies of making loans to the 
poor adds to the difficulty of finding an ‘ideal’ group of clients that hitherto had been 
neglected by traditional banks but viewed as ‘bankable’ clients in microfinance. Practices 
such as group lending, joint liability, receipt of subsidies, grants and government direct 
intervention, small and frequent loan repayments, forced savings, maintenance of a 
minimum balance of savings throughout the loan life and incorporating other non-
financial services complicates the adaptation of banking theory to suit microfinance. 
These issues directly or indirectly affect the core factors of determining interest rate,  that 
is loan loss, transaction cost and mark-up. We discuss briefly in the following sub-
sections issues mainly surrounding transaction cost as it is the main perceived driver of 
interest rate. 
 
Efficiency and Interest Rate 
Proponents of microfinance paradigm argue strongly on the capability to drive down 
interest rate by achieving efficiency via economies of scale. While this notion is 
consistent with basic economic literature, Rosenberg et al. (2009) reports that 
microfinance institutions benefit marginally beyond 2000 number of clients. In their 
viewpoint, economies of scale cannot do much to offset the added expense emerging 
from the dispensation of small loans and frequent servicing.  Added to this, other factors 
including competition, lower transaction cost and subsidy are indispensable in trying to 
achieve efficiency. Porteous (2006) use the market development continuum framework5 
to assess price competition in three different microfinance markets in Bolivia, 
                                                 
3
 Screening, Monitoring and Enforcement. 
4
 Among the non-asset based strategies include credit history, submission and assessment of business plans and their 
viability and other demographic and communal records. 
5
 The market development continuum framework identifies four stages of development. Stages one and two describe 
the pioneering and take-off phases which is supply driven in terms of price determination. While stages three and four 
asserts the consolidation and maturity phases which offers price competition and other lower cost driving factors such 
as efficiency and technological innovation. This stage is primarily driven by consumers (demand). 
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Bangladesh and Uganda. An intriguing finding of Porteous’ assessment is the possibility 
of microfinance markets to delay unduly price competition as observed in Bangladesh 
microfinance market. In contrast, the Bolivian microfinance market drove down interest 
rates through price competition at a very early stage of their market development, while 
the Ugandan market was observed to be entering the consolidation phase. 
 
The aforementioned observations offer significant number of caveats that are worth 
considering in asserting plausibility of driving down interest rates through competition, 
lower transaction cost, subsidy, efficiency and scale. We assert in this paper that the 
success of these supply-side factors depends on the socio-economic characteristics of 
clients. Thus average return on economic activity is an important determinant of client’s 
influence on the relationship between interest rate and loan take-up. 
 
Transaction Cost 
Pricing of microfinance services like any other good or service is a function of 
transaction cost. Transaction cost in the delivery of financial services, basically has three 
components; the cost of funds for on-lending, the cost of risk (loan loss) and 
administrative cost (processing loan applications, educating or training of clients and 
monitoring for loan repayment)6. The above makes it imperative to reach the conclusion 
that absolute transaction cost per head of the poor is more expensive than a client of a 
formal financial institution. 
 
Received wisdom has long been that, lending to poor households is not worth it due to 
too high costs, too great risks, too low saving propensities and too few households 
capable of putting up collateral (Morduch, 1999). The likely consequences of these 
adverse characteristics have been dealt with through alternative mechanisms such as 
group lending and joint liability, forced savings and small and regular loans and 
repayment. These mechanisms seem to prove that microfinance can be sustainable. In 
spite of the ingenuity of delegated screening, monitoring and enforcement, transaction 
cost are up the roof and used as the main argument for high interest rates. Obvious 
reasons are the other strategies of microfinance operations including small amounts of 
loans and forced savings, remote settlements and provision of non-financial services. For 
instance, Rosenberg et al. (2009) asserts that the effect of compulsory savings increases 
the effective cost of the loan to the borrower. 
  
In microfinance, cost components of animating groups, purchase of forms, implications 
of ‘forced-savings’ and frequent repayment rate constitutes the difference between real 
and effective interest rate. The precise magnitude of the difference is unknown but 
anecdotal evidence points to a more than 100 per cent gap. Less obvious, but added to 
this cost component is time spent and opportunity cost in servicing the loan. In the case 
of poor clients this is high due to the inclusion of non-financial services as loan 
beneficiaries spend more time with bank staff. Finally non-use of high technological 
devices such as computerized operations increases per unit cost. 
                                                 
6
 It is important to underscore the need non-quantifiable component of transactional cost normally emerging from the 
perspective of the borrower. This includes waiting time with or at bank premises, transportation cost and cost of delay 
in receiving loans.   
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Subsidies 
Poverty reduction through subsidized credit was the centrepiece of development 
strategies of many countries from the early 1950s through to the 1980s. Available 
evidence suggests that the strategy failed for a number of reasons. This include low loan 
repayment rates which dropped to below 50 per cent in some cases, increased cost to 
donor and worsening government fiscal deficit and diversion of credit from intended 
recipients to political favourites (Adams, Graham and Von Pischke, 1984). The 
justification for its re-emergence is the balance between social and economic objectives 
of microfinance. For instance, the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development 
(IGVGD) run by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) targets the 
destitute and as such has a strong inclination for its social mission. The compelling 
advocacy of financial systems approach provides a counterargument on the impact of 
subsidies.  
 
The strategy, abandoned some years ago, has re-emerged in microfinance with much 
harder questions of extent, nature and time of subsidy utilization as against the either/or 
argument of subsidy. The current debate departs from the extremes and asserts the need 
on some form of subsidy, packaged in an ‘ideal’ manner and delivered to the ‘right’ 
beneficiary at the ‘right’ time. Open fields will always remain in an attempt to provide 
responses to these questions. For instance amount and time of subsidy depends on 
peculiar characteristics of both institutions and its clients and the extent of competition 
and/or influence of the immediate environment. Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 
(2005) posit that the amount of subsidy depends on factors including sensitivity of credit 
demand to interest rates, adjustment time between increases in income and well-being, 
returns to investment by poorer households and negative externality of subsidized credit 
programmes to other lenders. 
  
The debate is further stretched on who receives the subsidy. For instance, directing 
subsidies to institutional strengthening of which clients at the outset will pay full 
recovery rate but indirectly benefit from structures such as credit bureaus that smoothens 
the delivery of financial services. From a more pragmatic perspective some institutions 
have rolled out client sourcing of subsidies over time and product. This allows for 
institutions to offer some non-financial services such as food aid, health and education at 
subsidized rate and latter or concurrently role-out commercial lending rate schemes. 
Though applauded for its relativity better intuitiveness the IGVGD programme of BRAC 
experienced a massive drop-out with clients that benefited for this intervention. Also 
closely related to this type of intervention is the emergence of cross-subsidy that 
segments the markets and discriminates in the pricing of loan. Segmentation has 
principally depended on the economic activity, repeated loans, repayment and sometimes 
perceived average returns of the economic activity. These have well been conceived from 
a theoretical perspective but most microfinance institutions grapple with its 
implementation. The main problem is attributable to lack of a thorough understanding of 
client responsiveness to pricing of loan. 
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Non-sensitivity of Interest rate 
Theoretically positing a perfect inelastic demand for credit will lead to market failure at 
least in the frame of neo-classical economics. Paradoxically, in the microfinance setting 
this stand-point has dominated for more than two decades. The perception that 
microfinance is designed for the poor who live on the fringes of survival partially justifies 
the non-responsive to loan amount. That is, due to the dire need for money to survive and 
other market constraints such as non-competitive market environment and information 
asymmetry, cost of borrowing does not inform the decision to access a loan or otherwise. 
Morduch, (2000) prioritizes this view point for the ‘win-win’ rhetoric. The perception 
that raising costs of financial service does not diminish demand triggers off a fertile 
ground for possible consumer abuse. The likely consequence of this in a market-
determined system is shifting total transaction cost plus inefficiency onto the client. The 
existence of information asymmetry in the market as a result of non disclosure of loan 
costs and entire portfolio by micro lenders also limits the options for the borrower. 
 
Generally, ability to repay has been used as the benchmark for the success of 
microfinance programmes. What is not discussed are the strategies used for repayment 
and whether these translates positively to increased consumption and income and 
eventually well-being. Anecdotal evidence points to a situation where at the time of 
repayment, some household assets are sold out of distress. The adverse effect of this 
phenomenon is the creation of a vicious cycle of poverty. Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
related to the above assert that clients scout around and borrow from other source to 
repay loan. 
 
Recent empirical studies on client sensitivity (Dehejia et al, 2005, Briones, (2007) & 
Karlan and Zinman, 2008) offer a contrasting outcome to the perceived borrowers 
insensitivity to changes in interest rate. The most recent study, Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
use randomized experiment to show that loan size is sensitive at the extensive margin of 
interest rate changes. This is observed in a hypothetical case of a 100 per cent increase in 
monthly interest rate. However, they observe that loan maturity is more responsive of 
loan size than interest rate changes. In line with our main hypothesis, Karlan and Zinman 
estimates the effects of targeting females and low income category of clients on a 
reduced. They observe that these groups show much stronger effects of loan size 
sensitivity to interest changes. 
  
Emerging consensus from the recent studies is sensitivity of microfinance clients. Dehejia 
et al. (2005) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) categorically show that the poor has a much 
stronger sensitivity. Characteristic of these recent empirical studies is testing the 
hypothesis on a reduced sample. Though robustness is implied in most of the estimation 
techniques of the previous studies, compromising reliability as a result of using a reduced 
sample is inevitable. We are motivated by this to explore the same hypothesis using an 
alternative empirical method. Instead of estimating the effect of the poor’s influence on a 
reduced sample we integrate poverty characteristics as a variable into the basic model. 
Quantile regression and interaction procedure in a least squares regression set-up are used 
to investigate the extent to which average returns (proxied by poverty status) moderates 
the relationship between loan size take-up and interest rate. Also, as demonstrated by 
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Porteous (2006) the need for a country specific study that explores institutional 
differences based on character type and source of funds is imperative. 
 
3. Microfinance Industry in Ghana 
In Ghana, the practice of sourcing funds from non-formal financial institutions dates back 
to 1955 when the Canadian Catholic Missionaries established the first credit union in 
Northern Ghana. The concept was expanded at the beginning of the 1970s with the 
establishment of the first rural bank at Nyakrom. Since the activities of such institutions 
were not considered as part of mainstream financial sector, their contribution to financial 
deepening was neither documented nor recognized until the latter part of the 1990s when 
issues of poverty reduction became part of developmental agenda. The shift from growth- 
led strategies to poverty reduction strategies provided an avenue for pro-poor policies and 
programmes. Recognizing access to credit as a major constraint to the promotion of pro-
poor activities, a number of institutions (governmental and non-governmental) emerged 
to provide financial services to the poor. 
  
In 1996, a number of groups involved in implementing micro-financing projects came 
together to form the Micro Finance Action Research Network (MFARN). The aim was to 
play an active role in policy discussion, formulation and implementation of programmes 
related to micro financing in the country. In 1998, the group changed its name to the 
Ghana Micro-finance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN). The objectives among others 
are to: strengthen the capacity of MFIs through training; sensitize government and 
stakeholders; contribute to the creation of employment opportunities; and provision of 
support and empowerment to the poor and excluded. 
  
At the governmental level a number of ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) have 
established desks or units for microfinance activities. Among the MDA with 
microfinance programmes are Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Office of the 
Senior Minister, Ministry for Women and Children Affairs, Bank of Ghana, Ministry of 
Local Government, Rural Development and Environment. To co-ordinate and streamline 
activities of the industry, a central body, known as the Microfinance and Small Loans 
Centre (MASLOC) was established in 2006. Its mandate is to, co-ordinate all 
microfinance activities in the country, especially that of government programmes and 
complement the activities of other microfinance apex bodies. 
 
The number of microfinance implementing institutions cuts across both formal and 
informal organizations. Five broad categories of institutions provide financial and 
technical services in the industry. These institutions are Rural and Community Banks 
(RCBS), Savings and Loans Companies (S & Ls), Financial Non-governmental 
Organizations (FNGOs), Credit Unions and Susu Collectors Association of Ghana. All 
these institutions have created their apex bodies and are spread in all the 10 regions of the 
country.  
 
In addition, some formal banks and insurance companies have linked up either with some 
existing microfinance institutions or created a microfinance department. The heightened 
interest and concerns of microfinance activities in Ghana drives the exploration of 
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complementary services and signals the need for market growth towards competition. 
Perceived availability of effective demand for financial services partly explains 
stakeholders’ sustained interest and concerns. 
 
4. Methods of Study 
Data Sources  
Data for the study is based on a survey of client and non-client households in Ghana7. For 
the survey, the country was divided into northern zone, consisting of the Upper West, 
Upper East and Northern Regions, the middle zone made up of the Brong Ahafo, Ashanti 
and Eastern Regions and the coastal zone covering the Volta, Greater Accra, Central and 
Western Regions. Based on assessment of microfinance institutions by ARB Apex Bank, 
Credit Union Association (CUA) and GHAMFIN on the activities and the performance of 
their members, 16 institutions were selected from the three zones. In addition, an 
institution using Susu methodology to mobilize funds was selected, giving a total of 17 
microfinance institutions. Clients of selected microfinance institutions were randomly 
selected and their households identified for the study. 
 
Clients of four rural banks, one Credit Union and two Financial Non-Governmental 
Organisations (FNGOs), were selected from the coastal zone; in the middle zone, two 
rural banks, one credit union, and one FNGO were selected. Finally clients of three rural 
banks and one FNGO were selected in the northern zone. The 17 institutions provided 
funds from their own resources, or the government channelled through either the district 
assembly or a Ministry and donor sources such as International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the World Bank and other bilateral agencies. 
 
To facilitate the test for sample selection effect, data on non-client households was 
assessed from the same study. A national representative data on 1102 non-clients 
households were randomly interviewed based on the framework of Ghana population 
census.  
  
Data collected included socio-demographic and economic profile of clients’ household, 
economic activities, employment history and institutional level indicators such as sources 
of finance and interest rates paid. Selected respondents were clients who had received 
loans for the first time within the last six months prior to the survey, or had been 
processed for loan. 
  
The total sample size for the study is 2691 units consisting of 1589 clients and 1102 non-
clients households was available for analysis. The sample varied at different stages of the 
analysis. For instance, based on institutional mandatory limitations on the loans 
mobilization clients of one of the five main categories were excluded in the final analysis. 
The mandate of susu8, like FNGOs are restricted in receiving deposits. But in the case of 
                                                 
7
 Data for the study was merged from two Bank of Ghana/World Bank sponsored projects under the broad theme - 
‘Poverty Assessment and a Comparative Study of Rural Microfinance Institutions and Government Credit Programmes 
in Ghana. The Poverty Assessment was carried out by the University of Cape Coast in which the author was a member 
of the core team. The Financial Performance was executed by Mawuko and Co. Consulting Services. 
8
 Quite recently, Barclays Bank, one of the biggest commercial banks in Ghana, has initiated  a product that 
fosters collaboration with susu companies. Among the principal objectives is to increase scale of operation 
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FNGOs some linkages with other financial institutions have permitted them to engage in 
receipt and dispensation of financial services. Steel and Aryeteey (1994) caution on the 
exclusivity of susu operations. Also Steel and Andah (2003) categorize individual susu 
collectors as informal. The final dataset for the analysis was based on respondents from 
rural banks, credit unions, savings and loan companies and financial non-governmental 
organizations. The analysis was restricted to clients of institutions that had received loan 
amount within the six months period prior to data collection. A potential demise of this 
approach is sample selection bias which has been addressed in this paper. A total of 698 
client households were analyzed. However exploratory and robustness check required 
additional dataset. The quantile regression estimation is based on a larger sample of 720 
clients which includes respondents paying back only the principal amount. Also 
robustness check for sample selection problems required inclusion of non-client sample 
making the total sample 2650 (698 +1102). 
 
Poverty Score Estimation 
The study used the Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool (MPAT) developed by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to construct a multidimensional poverty 
index. Based on the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), it combines various welfare 
variables including housing conditions and characteristics, food security and 
vulnerability, livestock and consumption assets to calculate a household relative poverty 
index. The MPAT method, as a measure of relative poverty, has the advantage of 
collecting cross-sectional data which can be used to construct a multidimensional poverty 
index (Henry et al, 2003). A poverty score of zero hypothetically denotes an average 
level of poverty, with the higher and lower scores connoting relatively less poor and 
extreme poor respectively. This meant that an institution with a better depth of outreach 
will have scores averaging lower than zero while institutions reaching less poor clients 
will have an average value greater than zero. Computed household poverty score 
normally ranges between 3. Poverty scores for clients of selected microfinance 
institutions ranged from -1.515 (reaching the poor – better outreach) to 1.204 (reaching 
the less poor) with a mean poverty score of 0.2847. Averagely all the institutions were 
reaching less poor clients. (See Appendix 1 for some more detail and table 1 for the 
variables that emerged finally for the computation of household poverty scores).  
 
Insert table one here 
 
For comparison, figure 1 below categorizes client respondents into five groups. 
Household indices are arranged in ascending order and classified into quintiles. In this 
sense the MPAT is applied in a comparative context by categorizing respondents into 
groups. This approach permits ranking poverty groups from extreme poor to non-poor. 
As evidenced in figure 1 below, the cut-off for extreme poor category (bottom twenty 
percent) is -0.81. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
which implies exploration of deposit taking opportunities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this has led to 
increased cost of operation and subsequently interest rates. 
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Figure 1: 
Definition of Quintiles 
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The choice of quintile classifications over other cluster options is informed by the recent 
outcome of the category of extreme poor households in Ghana. Ghana Statistical Service 
2007 shows a national extreme head count poverty of one out every five persons. This 
benchmark is important for validation and consistent policy direction. 
 
We validate the poverty measure of the current study with the 2005 national living 
standard measurement survey. Comparing the patterns of poverty for these two datasets 
across administrative regions of the country, we observe a 91 per cent degree of 
association. Also similar patterns of poverty were observed based on broad rural/urban 
classification and ecological zones (Appendix II, Figure 2). 
  
Specification of Econometric Models 
The model specification is consistent with standard demand for loan amount theory. The 
apriori expectation of an inverse relationship is explained by the following two plausible 
transmission mechanisms. The first argument, typical to microfinance operations asserts 
that relatively higher cost in administering smaller loans underpins the inverse 
relationship. In other words as the loan amount increases per unit cost of administering 
reduces. The second reason subscribes to models of consumer inter-temporal choice that 
predicts a downward sloping demand curve with respect to price. 
 
Parametric Quantile Regression and Least Squares Estimation 
Inspired by the restrictions of Gaussian assumptions of linearity and zero conditional 
mean, Koenker and Basset (1978) proofs that for any distribution that the median is a 
better measure of location, the regression median9 is more efficient. In contrast to least 
squares assuming that the expected value of the error term conditional on the covariates is 
zero, quantile regression sorts the data and identifies a threshold (τ) to estimate the 
coefficient (β) that minimizes the sum of absolute residuals. The general set-up of 
quantile regression, equation 3.1 below is solved from an optimization perspective using 
linear programming. 
 
   ( ) ( )βρβ τ
β
τ
τ
ii
n
i
xy
K
'
1
minarg −Σ=
=ℜ∈
Λ
             3.1 
                                                 
9
 The proof of the median regression can is easily replicated for other to other percentiles (quantiles). 
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Where estimated β(τ) called ‘tauth’ (τth) regression quantile estimates the coefficient at a 
specified threshold (τ). τ is the sample quantile and takes on any value that between 0 and 
1. The expression ( )βρ τ ii xy '− , the absolute value function, weights the absolute 
difference between iy and βix ' with τ and by (1 – τ) for all observations below the 
estimated hyperplane. Koenker and Basset (1978) estimates conditional quantiles using 
the minimization procedure synonymous to least squares. 
 
Interaction Procedure 
The observation of varying interest rate at different percentiles of loan size pre-empts an 
investigation of the factors likely to affect the relationship between interest rate and loan 
size. Karlan and Zinman (2008) identify external factors of targeting females and low 
income category of clients as potential influences on the relationship between interest rate 
and loan size. Based on this, we apply the interaction method to least squares and 
compare our results with the subsamples used in other approaches. The study’s 
hypothesis informs the specification of a functional relationship positing that the effect of 
interest rate on loan size is moderated by the socio-economic well being of the client. 
This translates into the specification of equation 3.2.  
 
Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) suggests the need for an initial null hypothesis test to verify 
the presence of an interaction term in a model. The null hypothesis asserts that the 
regression coefficient for the product term is zero. Also assessing the strength and nature 
of the interaction term further justifies the choice statistic to be estimated based on the 
theoretical and intuitive propositions. The exploratory test uses the basic multiplicative 
approach to interact the two continuous terms of poverty scores and interest rate in our 
model. The test for the two equations (with and without the interaction term) indicates an 
F-value of 30 implying the presence of a statistical interaction between poverty score and 
interest rate in the loan size equation. In this paper, we assume linear10 dependence 
between poverty score and interest rate. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and 
confirm the assertion of Dehejia et al. (2005) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) that the poor 
moderates the relationship between interest rate and loan size. The strength of the 
relationship from the multiplicative perspective shows that the interaction effect accounts 
for 2 per cent of the variance in loan size. Interpreting coefficients in a model with an 
interactive term, especially in the case of multiplicative interacted variables is always 
received with a pinch of salt. Aiken and West (1990) and Jaccard and Turrissi (2003) 
both suggest potential problems, notably multicollinearity in interpreting equation 3.3 
given product terms added to the right-hand side variables. 
 
2.3.*. 43210 iiiii erIntPovrIntPovLS X +++−+= βββββ  
 
Where LS is the loan amount, Pov is the household poverty score; Int.r is the interest rate 
Pov*Int.r is the interaction for the centred variables of household poverty score and 
                                                 
10
 We are cognizant of the other dimensions of dependence such as varying relationship along the slope and 
shape culminating into a non-linear relationship between poverty score and interest rate. But for brevity we 
limit the discussion to a theoretical bilinear relationship. 
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interest rate and X is the vector of other household factors that influence demand for loan 
amount. Specifying the equation in this form, asserts that the interest-responsiveness of 
the ith borrower can be inferred from the derivative (equation 3.3) and the predicted 
amount of loan size is dependent on the poverty rate of client (equation 3.3).  
 
  
3.3
.
32 PovrInt
LS
i
i
ΛΛ
+−=∂
∂ ββ
 
 
Aiken and West (1990) compare uncentred and centred variables in estimated equations 
and conclude that centred analysis be employed as it facilitates a more intuitive 
interpretation for interacted variables. With this background of evidence we explore the 
interaction effect in more detail using specific statistic (mean and different percentiles) of 
the moderating variable, poverty scores. 
 
Second Stage Estimations 
We undertake Instrumental Variable (IV) and Heckman second stage estimations to 
correct for plausible endogeneity and selection bias respectively. Though the likely 
incidence of reverse causality is minimised with a restricted sample of new clients and 
current amount of loan take-up, endogeneity is still plausible. Multiple sources of 
endogeneity including omitted variables are likely to bias our estimates. Specific to this 
paper, institutional features that complement the effect of interest rate on loan size is 
likely to affect our equation via an omitted variable perspective. Typically, one can argue 
that institutional performance can cause interest rate endogeneity. Identifying operational 
self sufficiency11 as an instrument for interest rate and measure of institutional 
performance we address the two pronged requirements for the use of IV. The initial 
testable requirement shows that the correlation between interest rate and operational self 
sufficiency is 0.40. The second pre-requisite which requires intuition and theory points to 
a minimal association between operational self sufficiency and the error term of the loan 
size equation. We argue that due to institution’s risk perception of first and repeated 
loans12 restricting the sample to new clients nullifies the plausible effect of institutional 
performance on amount of loan disbursed. In view of the above, we propose that the 
interest rate coefficient is biased downwards as a result of the inverse relationship 
between the instrument and loan size on one hand and positive relationship between 
interest rate and operational self sufficiency. 
 
In the case of sample effect, Armendariz de Aghion, and Morduch (2005) points out that 
impact studies in microfinance are decidedly mixed as a result of methodological issues 
including selection bias. We correct for sample problems that emerge on the premise of; 
(a) probability of an individual participating in a microfinance programme and (b) 
likelihood of being a member and accessing a loan. Identifying an exclusive variable for 
the participation equation is always daunting given the demise of a trade-off in the 
                                                 
11
 Operational Self Sufficiency is measured as financial revenue/ (financial expense + net loan loss 
provision expense + operating expense). The unadjusted subsidy effect explains the effect of donors and 
government in amount of loan disbursed. 
12
 Anecdote suggests that microfinance institutions use donor and government grants mostly for first time 
loans and as such are not very particular about its effect on the sustainability of their operations. 
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efficiency of our results. The potential of huge standard errors in second stage estimation 
is verified by comparing our results with least squares. Occupational category of 
respondent that is either self employed or otherwise is used as the exclusive variable. The 
choice of this variable is rationalized by the preponderance of self employed 
entrepreneurs in microfinance. 
 
We therefore estimate an outcome equation as; 
 iiiiiii zClxLS X ηγτσα ++== )(1;| 4'4
^^
1211                  3.4 
Where σ12 denotes the error term emerging from the participation and outcome equations; 
)( 4'4
^
γiz  is the variable representing Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for each of the observed 
households computed from a participation equation; τ is the
 
coefficient of the IMR and ηi 
is the normal stochastic term for an OLS and X is the vector of covariates in our outcome 
equation.  
 
Finally, to compare our approach to that of previous studies, we estimate interest rate 
effect on two sub-samples. Equations 3.5 and 3.6 specify the estimation of two sub-
samples {poorest sample (bottom twenty per cent) and non-poor sample (upper eighty per 
cent)}. Categorization of the sample into quintiles and the exploratory outcome of the 
box and whisker plot informed the specification of the two broad regressions. As 
observed, the variability between the poorest twenty per cent and the other group is both 
economically and statistically significant13 Equation 3.7 estimates a restricted model that 
includes a dummy to capture the effect of poverty. 
 
5.3. 4210 iiii erIntPovLS X ++−+= ββββ                                                  
(Poorest Sample) 
 
6.3. 4210 iiii erIntPovLS X ++−+= ββββ    
 (Otherwise Sample) 
 
7.354.210 ieipoorNonirIntiPoviLS X +−++−+= βββββ                                      
(Unrestricted Model) 
 
We apply the traditional Chow Test14 to examine consistency in slope coefficients 
between the unrestricted (equations 3.5 and 3.6) and the restricted (equation 3.7) models. 
Equations 3.4 and 3.5 are tested concurrently against the restricted model of equation 3.7. 
Though robust estimation to a large extent have been meticulously considered at different 
stages of this study we are humble in asserting a definite uni-causality from interest rate 
to loan size due to the cross sectional nature of our dataset. 
                                                 
13
 Calculated  t-value for the difference in average interest rate between the bottom twenty per cent and the 
upper eighty per cent is 4.5 denoting statistical significance of the variation for the two groups. 
14
  The Chow Test like any other F-test, tests the hypothesis of equal slopes in the different subsamples (See 
Wooldridge 2006). 
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 5. Results and Discussion 
The central hypothesis posits that loan size sensitivity will have varying slopes as a result 
of the different socio-economic characteristics of clients. Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
observed a kinked demand curve confirming stronger sensitivity effect at the extensive 
margins of interest rates. Though quite informative, we suspect that limiting the empirical 
investigation to a subsample blurs a possible higher frequent and deeper variation in loan 
size responsiveness among microfinance clients. Table 2 presents the mean and different 
percentiles of interest rates for each of the quintiles. The former underpins regression 
analysis (maximum likelihood and least squares) used in previous studies and the latter 
justifies our choice of quantile regression and application of interaction procedures. 
 
Insert tables 2a and 2b here 
 
Tables 2a and 2b clearly evidence the extent to which use of mean suppresses variations 
at different percentiles. The box and whisker plot of figure 3 shows that the minimum and 
maximum interest rates are not restricted to a particular category of clients. Table 2a 
describes the loan amount received by different poverty quintiles. We observe different 
levels of variability between the groups based on the choice of statistic. While the mean 
shows a difference of about 30 times between the extreme and very poor the median 
accounts for a 3 times difference.  Comparing figure 3 and table 2, heterogeneity in 
interest rate is observed at the lower end of the socio-economic distribution. For instance, 
the fifth percentile shows 0 per cent interest rate for the very poor category compared to 
20 per cent for the other groups. Also at the extensive margin it is observed that the 95th 
percentile is 48 per cent for the extreme poor category compared to 42 per cent for the 
other groups.  Also, interest rates tend to vary in an inconsistent fashion for the different 
categories of extreme and very poor clients. At the other end, changes in interest rates 
across the quantiles tend to show consistent variations for the poor to non-poor category. 
This observation makes the use of least squares susceptible to a blurred response as it is 
premised on the mean which shows an increase in average interest rate from extreme 
poor to non-poor. The difference among groups based on choice of statistic has 
implications in drawing inferences and predictions using higher level estimation 
techniques precedent on either the mean or the median. 
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FIGURE 3: 
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In table 2 we show the distribution of interest rates across the five socio-economic 
categories of microfinance clients at the mean and different percentiles. Noticing with 
much alacrity is the twist at 5th percentile which shows 0% lending rate for the very poor 
category compared to 20% for all the other groups including the extreme poor. This 
observation suggests a platform of plausible market distortion detrimental to the long 
term sustainability of microfinance. The uni-variate statistics of Table 3, offer a 
comparison between interest rate charged and the simple average of poverty score for 
various programmes15 of the respective microfinance institutions. The annualized16 
nominal17 interest rates charged ranged from 0% to 48% with a respective mean and 
median of 32% and 35% for all the programmes of the institutions. The wide range of 
48% characterizing microfinance evokes concerns on why and who benefits and pays 
what. The observed mean lending rate of 32% (Table 2) is more than twice the prime rate 
of 14.5% and about 11% more than the borrowing rate of traditional banking institutions 
to the public. 
 
Insert table three here 
 
In an earlier empirical paper, Amonoo et al. (2003) observe that the mean nominal 
lending rate to the poor in the Central Region of Ghana is about 45% per annum. In table 
                                                 
15
 Programme in this study is defined as the source of funds. That is either institutional own mobilized funds, sourced 
from donor or government. For the purposes of analysis we generate dummy for own programme interpreted as 
institutional mobilized funds and otherwise. The rationale is that funds sourced from donor and government are 
external to the institution. 
16
 Worth mentioning is the use of adjustment factors. Due to the varied approaches of handling interest rate overtime 
including ‘reducing balance’ and ‘flat’ method, we annualize all the rates and adjust all methods of calculation to the 
‘flat method’. The ‘reducing balance’ method calculates interest rate based on the balance while the ‘flat’ method is 
based on the principal. 
17
 A logical argument will be to apply either real or effective interest as the unit of analysis is the household.  However 
due to respondent’s lack of ability to quantify other transaction cost and variations in personal inflation rate we use the 
nominal interest rate. 
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2, the average lending rate of shows a much lower rate by 13% points. A potential source 
of variation is the different scope of the two studies. Since the current study is nationally 
representative, characteristics of the respondents in peri-urban and urban areas are likely 
to influence interest rate. The notion that transaction cost are higher in dealing with poor 
clients might be a potential justification for the high interest rate of 45% in the previous 
study as it was conducted in one of the four poorest regions of Ghana. To the contrary we 
observe from the study that while the mean shows higher lending rates for less poor 
clients the evidence is mixed at different percentiles. This signals other influences on 
lending rate such as source of funds. From table 3 we observe that the cost of accessing a 
loan funded by the Government was on the average a third lower than programmes 
dispensed with own funds. This augments contemporary knowledge that institutional 
funds mobilized through owner’s equity, savings and shares are geared-up for 
commercialization as opposed to external funds (Rhyne, 1998).  
 
The last column of Table 3 shows the poverty scores of client’s households. The results 
indicate that RB2 with scores of -1.1513 and -1.515 for its two programmes and FNGO1 
with a score of -1.1187 report reaching very poor clients. The principal reason accounting 
for this is the location of the institutions. These institutions are located in the northern 
part of the country where poverty is most endemic. Annim et al. (2008) assesses the 
spatial dimension and implication of microfinance institutions in Ghana. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Figure 4, demonstrates concisely the quantile responsiveness of loan size for each of the 
covariates. For brevity, we restrict our discussion to the main covariate interest rate and 
factors most likely to influence targeting (poverty and sex of client). The thick dashed 
line plots the respective least squares coefficient and the light point dots are the 
confidence intervals. The quantile regression coefficients are represented for the various 
percentiles with the curved lines and respective confidence intervals are shown with the 
dim background. At a glance, we observe broadly that interest rate, show inconsistent 
responsiveness of loan size at different quantiles. The least squares shows that marginal 
upward variation in interest rate results in a 0.7 (less than unitary – table 4) downward 
change in loan size. But the question remains as to whether this is consistent across all 
the segments of the distribution. The quantile regression shows that the change is much 
higher for the lower quantile (up to about 40th), fairly stable for the middle quantile 
(between 40th and 65th) and falls further for the higher quantiles.  
 
Insert table four here 
 
Sex of client, on the other hand demonstrates fairly consistent results for both least 
squares and quantile regression. The only observable variation is at the lower quantile of 
a difference between male and female clients higher than 17 per cent. With both 
covariates, the respective 5 per cent significance level observed from the least squares, is 
not consistent across the quantiles (Table 4). The inconsistency incites probes into the 
resilience and reliability of the least squares estimates. We address, these probes by 
exploring the interaction effect and checking for robustness using second stage estimation 
techniques. 
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                                                            Figure 4 
Least Squares and Quantile Regressions Coefficients 
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Based on the observation from the quantile regression and the empirical verification of 
the presence of an interaction term in section 4, we hypothesise that client well-being 
moderates the effect of the relationship between loan size and interest rate. The first 
column of table 5 presents the model with the interactive term at the centred predictor, 
moderator and their interaction. We opt for centred of the variables as explained in 
section 4 of the paper. We estimate this relationship bearing in mind the effect of other 
covariates including; number of savings account held by the borrower, location, sex of 
client, household size and others (see table 5). The interpretation of the sign and 
coefficient of the predictor with an interaction generates much complexity depending on 
the statistic of the moderating variable (Wooldridge 2006). Our initial result at the 
centred value is to provide an intuitive interpretation of equation 3.2 at the mean poverty 
rate. Thus the semi-elasticity of interest rate to loan size is quite marginal (0.2%, 
relatively inelastic) and insignificant. This provides an insufficient evidence to reject the 
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null hypothesis of microfinance client insensitivity. This initial result runs parallel to 
recent studies (Dehejia et al (2005), Briones, (2007) and Karlan and Zinman, (2008)) of 
an elasticity coefficient close to unitary.  
 
 
Insert tables five and six here 
 
Table 6 compares interest rate at varied statistic and offer a deeper insight as to which 
category of clients is sensitive. Each percentile of the interaction variable describes a 
segment of clients’ socio-economic characteristics. The choice for the 20th percentile is 
informed by the extreme poverty statistics in Ghana and also the evidence of a high 
coefficient of variation for this group (table 2). The 50th and 75th were selected due to 
the basic standardization of these percentiles. Column 3, Table 6 shows that estimating 
equation 3.2 at a value that describes the characteristics of the very poor (20th quantile), 
the responsiveness of loan size to interest rate changes is more than unitary (2.4%), 
downward sloping and significant at less than one per cent. This shows strong 
responsiveness by the extreme poor and offers consistent finding with earlier studies. 
However in each of the other statistic either the coefficient is not significant (mean and 
50th percentile) or it shows a positive sign (50th and 75th percentiles). 
  
The significant inverse response of loan size to a unit change in interest rate literally 
implies that poorer clients’ dropout with higher interest rates. This finding might suggests 
some reasons for the failure of the IGVGD programme in Bangladesh. We are tempted to 
support the preposition that microfinance is ideal for a particular segment of poor clients 
normally tagged as ‘brave poor’. The labelling of microfinance clients as ‘brave’ can be 
interpreted from the perspective of the upper eighty per cent that are non-responsive to 
interest rate changes. Assuming non-responsiveness imply repayment it is utterly 
important to identify channels of repayment. Among the unconventional means adopted 
by clients to repay include; multiple borrowing from different institutions and sale of 
assets. Some anecdotal evidence suggests suicidal tendencies in the long-run when both 
conventional and unconventional modes for repayment are exhausted. 
  
Columns 2-5, table 5 offers a comparison both within and between the current study’s 
approach and the use of subsamples. Comparing the coefficient of interest rate for the 
subsample of the bottom twenty percent with the interaction term of the 20th percentile 
we observe a consistent sign and significance level. Though in both estimates we observe 
a more than unitary loan size responsiveness the difference of about 2 per cent is worth 
considering. Worth observing from all five columns a downward sloping demand curve 
for all estimates but the non-poor sample. The outcome of positive coefficient is 
supported by the 50th and 75th percentiles in table 6.  
 
We estimate equations 3.5 to 3.7 to empirically test differences in regression slopes 
across groups. In our context, it is the bottom twenty percent (column 2, table 5) vis-à-vis 
the non-poor sample (column 3, table 5) compared with the restricted model (column 4, 
table 5). The significant chow test value of 14.47(0.000) imply the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the slopes do not change if the subsamples used. This finding upholds the 
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need to formally include a variable capturing the socio-economic characteristics of the 
poor into the estimation model instead of estimating subsamples as offered in previous 
studies.  
 
Table 7 offers second stage estimation results that seek to correct for endogeneity and 
sample selection problems. Correcting for endogeneity, we observe that the interest rate 
coefficient increase by a margin of 0.06.  The use of operational self sufficiency which is 
positively correlated with nominal interest rate and inversely related with loan size 
resolves the plausible underestimation. This suggests that using effective interest rate is 
likely to show greater responsiveness relative to nominal interest rate. The Hausman test 
shows that the IV coefficients are better in spite of the huge standard errors.  
 
Insert table seven here 
 
Columns 4a and 4b address the problem of sample selection from two perspectives. The 
first perspective (column 4a) compares the effect of restricting the sample to only those 
who accessed loans vis-à-vis other microfinance clients and the second stage compares 
the former with both clients and non-clients. We propose that self selection into 
microfinance programmes and ability to assess a loan is determined by whether the 
respondent is self employed or otherwise. The general belief is that self employed people 
self select themselves into microfinance programmes as non-self employed respondents 
are likely to have assess to traditional financial institutions and other sources of funds. 
The sample selection indicator (sigma) shows a much higher effect between those whose 
assessed loans and other microfinance clients. The test of independence between the 
participation and the outcome equations also show significant results. Although, the 
variation in interest rate is not huge it worth commenting that correcting for selection 
problems leads to significant changes in other covariates such as client status and source 
of funds. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Achieving financial sustainability and reaching very poor clients concurrently, has been 
the prime discourse of microfinance paradigm. The expectation is to provide services to 
the poor at low effective interest rates. Through this an institution achieves the dual 
purpose of reaching the poor and providing services on a commercial scale. Behavioural 
patterns of clients of MFI seem to vary in view of their different socio-economic well 
being. The major conclusion of this study supports recent findings of microfinance client 
sensitivity to interest rates changes but with a strong caveat. We assert the variability of 
borrower’s responsiveness to interest rate in contrast to ascribing generic sensitivity for 
all microfinance clients. Poorest clients show significant and more than unitary 
responsiveness to loan amount for a marginal increase in lending rate. Among the main 
plausible reasons for this observation is the theoretical knowledge of the poor’s aversion. 
Secondly, the dominance of group lending mechanism among the poorest group 
compared to the non-poor potentially reduces information asymmetry leading to rationale 
economic behaviour of reducing loan amount as interest rate increases. Thirdly, poorer 
clients are likely to have less resilience to shocks and as such have a higher probability to 
decline in assessing more loan as it price increases. The non-responsiveness of less poor 
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clients can be associated with their enthusiastic desire to make a living (‘brave poor’) 
making them at least risk neutral if not lovers. While one could surmise other reasons 
including limited supply of loan market alternatives this is one area that needs further 
empirical exploration as part of the process of deepening the outreach of institutions. 
 
The observed upward responsiveness between the second-stage instrumental variable and 
the first-stage estimations suggests the need to analyse clients’ responsiveness from the 
perspective of their cost rather than institutional nominal interest rates. Cost from the 
perspective of clients reveals the difference between nominal and effective interest rates. 
Estimating the responsiveness from these two perspectives suggests the ineffectiveness of   
intervention strategies such as interest rate capping since institutions are able to pass on 
cost to clients through other channels other than phase value (nominal) interest rates. 
 
Microfinance proponents have argued with the arsenal that the poor are capable of paying 
back loans with minimal consideration to hurdles encountered during repayment. 
Although some category of clients may be insensitivity to interest rate as observed from 
the study, theoretical prepositions of adverse implications such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection roars at the long term success of reducing poverty and augmenting main 
stream financial sector. We subscribe to recent market segmentation advocacy but 
propose the use of borrower’s responsiveness to complement traditional client 
differentiation methods including type of economic activity and community level 
indicators. This will enhance the achievement of client specific needs to complement 
location specific and type of economic activity driven needs. Secondly a broader 
interventionist approach should be employed in the case of subsidy use. In this light, 
sensitivity thresholds will always pre-determine a likely drop-out. In a comprehensive 
sense, to prevent drop-out of poor clients as experienced from the IGVGD programme in 
Bangladesh synergies between financial products, institutional structures and client socio-
economic characteristics should be timely and concurrently administered. 
 
 
Areas for further work points to the use of extensive datasets to explore bi-causality 
between loan amount and its price in the case repeated loans. Also issues of effective 
interest rate and higher-order interactive terms that includes repayment rate, loan 
schedules and economic activity will offer in- depth policy direction for practitioners of 
clients responsiveness to a blend of strategies.  
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APPENDIX I 
ESTIMATING POVERTY INDEX - MICROFINANCE POVERTY ASSESSMENT 
TOOL 
 
The theoretical underpin of the Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool (MPAT) as 
developed by the Henry et al (2003), is multidimensional poverty in contrast to uni-
dimensional poverty that has attracted huge criticisms due to its narrow perspective. 
In developing economies, where varied assets do not easily translate into either an 
income or money metric measure such approaches attract enormous variability due to 
measurement error. The multidimensional approach seem more convincing as the 
pool of a multiplicity of factors attaches relative importance to a number of 
dimensions to estimate well-being. Compared to the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) which is credited for its detail, the MPAT approach is less expensive, 
time saving and more importantly uses both ordinal and cardinal variables in its 
approach to estimate a household index. The latter surmounts the LSMS strict 
adherence to a monetary and an absolute approach. The MPAT relaxes on these rigid 
approaches and caters for ranked variables, subjective perspectives, relative approach 
and comprehensible scope of poverty. 
 
In the context of multidimensional approaches, MPAT possesses peculiar merits of 
assessing poverty relative to other methods such as Rapid Appraisals and 
Participatory Appraisals. Both approaches to the measure of poverty are dominantly 
subjective as they are mainly people-centric in nature. Though this allows for a 
holistic and reflects entirely the experiential levels of poverty, complications tend to 
emerge if opinions of the community leaders are at variance with that of households 
in the case of Rapid Appraisals and also when a researcher has to deal with large 
sample sizes for the Participatory approach. The MPAT operates midway and chooses 
a sample to estimate a poverty score, then applies an arbitrarily cut-off poverty point 
to segment the sample into different categories. This invariably permits some degree 
of an objective approach, though the arbitrary choice of the cut-off that is either 
terciles or quintiles is subject some degree of criticism.  
 
The approach collects household level data using a contextualized generic instrument 
which has six main subcomponents. The subcomponents of the instrument are; (See 
Appendix 2 for the detailed instrument used for this study). 
 
o Demographic structure and economic activities 
o Footwear and clothing expenditure 
o Food security and vulnerability 
o Housing indicators 
o Land ownership 
o Ownership of assets 
 
Indicators for each of these components are structured to elicit both ordinal and ratio-
scaled data. For instance, while specific questions on footwear and clothing 
expenditure elicit ratio-scaled data, food security obtains information on a ranked 
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basis such as ‘how many times was food served in the past two days’? Questions of 
this nature transcend the narrow perspective of a money-metric perspective of poverty 
and provide further information on, for instance, food security, coping mechanisms, 
depth of poverty and vulnerability. 
 
The estimation procedure is built on main two descriptive statistical methods. First 
Linear Correlation Coefficient (LCC) and second the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA). The MPAT approaches the computational measure with a bias for household 
per capita expenditure on footwear on clothing as this is chosen as the benchmark 
variable. The choice of this variable though arbitrary is consistent with the level of 
prominence accorded to this variable in the early work of Streeten et al 1981 on basic 
needs. The LCC is the primary means of filtering poverty indicators to ascertain 
variables that best captures variations in relative household poverty (Henry et al, 
2003). The initial step is to run a bivariate correlation test of all the other indicators 
against household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing. The statistical 
criteria of P<0.01 and P<0.05 significance levels have been designated to identify 
variables that correlate very strongly and strong respectively. A table ranking the 
variables based on the level of significance, value and sign of correlation matrix and 
number of cases with missing values is generated to facilitate the implementation of 
the PCA. 
 
The PCA enables the extraction of a poverty component that can be used to extract a 
household specific index of relative poverty. It is capable of achieving this objective 
as it initially filters variables that have a strong correlation with a poverty benchmark 
indicator. Each component extracted captures a unique attribute shared by survey 
households on the presumption of their relative poverty characteristics. This does not 
preclude the presence of other associative reasons such as geographical location, 
cultural practices and occupation. To minimize the extent to which other reasons 
might lead to the extract of components other than the poverty component further 
filtering at the initial stage is done to limit to indicators to variables that are very 
strongly correlated with household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing. 
Some degree of intuition is applied to reduce the number of indicators, for instance, 
number of missing values for a particular indicator, a cluster of a number of 
indicators for one component and spread of indicators to capture other dimensions. 
 
The PCA allows for the computation of a linear combination of indicator variables. 
The ‘component-loading’ which represents the amount of correlation between the 
component variable and the indicator variable is successively revised based on factor 
analysis to arrive at a household relative poverty score. 
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                       APPENDIX II  - FIGURES & TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Variables used in constructing poverty index 
Components Indicators 
Geographical Location Urban or Rural location in rural savannah 
Food Security and Vulnerability Coping Strategy: frequency of reducing number of 
meals 
Quality of the House Index for type of ownership, access to water, 
electricity, quality of roof, walls toilets, etc. 
Assets of the Household  Motorcycle, bicycle, TV, stereo, radio, fridge, stove, 
sewing machine, fan, iron, etc. 
Access to basic needs Time (in minutes) to the nearest secondary school 
and pharmacist. 
Education Literacy and level of schooling of HH head, per cent 
of adults who have completed primary schooling, 
ratio of literate adults 
Occupation Number of adults self-employed in food crop 
agriculture and distance to the nearest food market. 
Expenditures Clothing and footwear expenditures per person. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Data Validation 
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Table 2a  
Loan Amount by Poverty Quintiles 
 
Poverty Groups  N  Mean  Max  Min  Median  
Extreme Poor  120  ¢45,628 
US$5.06  
> ¢2,000,000 
US$221.78 
¢30,000 
US$3.33 
¢335,000 
US$37.15 
Very Poor  153  ¢1,284,999 
US$142.49 
> ¢10,000,000 
US$1,108.89 
¢50,000 
US$5.54 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Poor  155  ¢1,511,087 
US$167.56  
> ¢10,000,000 
US$1,108.89 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Moderately Poor  124  ¢2,271,049 
US$251.84 
> ¢40,000,000  
US$4,435.57 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Non-Poor  146  ¢5,805,849 
US$643.81 
> ¢80,000,000  
US$8,875.17 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢2,000,000 
US$221.78 
Total 698  ¢2,313,587  
US$256.55 
>  ¢80,000,000 
US$8,871.15 
¢30,000  
US$3.33 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b 
Interest Rate by Poverty Quintile 
Poverty Quintiles N Mean P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 Coefficient of Variation 
Extreme Poor  317 30.49 20 20 28 35 48 0.324 
Very Poor 320 30.68 0 25 35 36 42              0.213 
Poor 318 32.52 20 30 35 37 42             0.183 
Moderately Poor 317 33.06 20 30 35 37 42             0.188 
Non-Poor 317 33.60 20 30 35 37 42             0.162 
Total 1589 32.07 20 28 35 37 48             0.220 
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Table 3 
Poverty Scores and Interest Rate Charged by Institution and Programme 
 
MFI Source of funds Interest rate per annum Poverty Score 
CU1  Deposits 25% 1.057 
Deposits 28% -1.513 RB2 
Donor 25% -1.515 
RB3 Deposits 35% -0.722 
FNGO1 Donor 48% -1.187 
Donor 35% 0.924 FNGO2 
Deposits 35% 0.924 
S & L Deposits 7% 1.204 
Deposits 36% 0.503 RB4 
Government 36% 0.274 
FNGO2 Deposit 25% 0.238 
Deposits 35% 0.023 RB5 
Government 0% 0.665 
RB6 Deposits 42% 0.767 
Government 20% -1.374 RB7 
Donor 20% -1.097 
Government 20% 0.797 RB8 
Deposit 34% 0.561 
Deposit 30% 0.709 
Deposit 30% 0.974 
Government 20% 0.555 
RB9 
Government 20% 0.365 
CU2 Deposit 36% 1.167 
Ashanti Deposit 37% 0.483 
Volta Deposit 37% 1.057 
Eastern Deposit 37% 0.957 
 
FNGO3 
Brong 
Ahafo 
Deposit 37% 0.642 
SUSU Deposit - 1.226 
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Table 4 
Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates 
*** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent * Significant at ten percent 
 
Coefficients & Standard Errors [Robust and Bootstrapped] 
Quantile  
Dependent Variable: 
Amount of Current 
Loan Take-up 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Least 
Squares 
(1) 
 
(2) 
10th 
(3) 
25th 
(4) 
50th 
(5) 
75th 
(6) 
90th 
 
Interest rate 
- 0.007 
(0.003)** 
- 0.000 
(0.003) 
- 0.002 
(0.003) 
- 0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
- 0.018 
(0.007)** 
Client Status 0.327 
(0.077)*** 
0.308 
(0.097)*** 
0.414 
(0.077)*** 
0.380 
(0.109)*** 
-0.302 
(0.119)*** 
0.200 
(0.180) 
Amount of Previous 
Loan 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)* 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Sex  of  Client  
- 0.170 
(0.066)** 
- 0.018 
(0.096) 
- 0.141 
(0.080)* 
- 0.148 
(0.091)*** 
- 0.207 
(0.091)** 
- 0.127 
(0.120) 
 
Poverty Score 
0.538 
(0.037)*** 
0.598 
(0.066)*** 
0.491 
(0.046)*** 
0.572 
(0.045)*** 
0.499 
(0.064)*** 
0.448 
(0.080)*** 
Number of Savings 
Account 
0.145 
(0.075)** 
0.016 
(0.099) 
0.019 
(0.065) 
0.035 
(0.122) 
0.188 
(0.086)** 
0.492 
(0.151) *** 
 
Source of funds 
0.074 
(0.083) 
- 0.042 
(0.163) 
 - 0.311 
(0.121)*** 
- 0.030 
(0.089) 
0.281 
(0.113)** 
0.571 
(0.182)*** 
 
Household size 
0.031 
(0.014)** 
 - 0.011 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.015)** 
0.048 
(0.020)** 
0.078 
(0.023)*** 
 
Location 
1.485 
(0.200)*** 
1.085 
(0.201) *** 
1.151 
(0.256)*** 
1.703 
(0.345) *** 
2.178 
(0.357)*** 
2.041 
(0.187) *** 
 
Constant 
13.377 
(0.151)*** 
12.486 
(0.153)*** 
13.222 
(0.237)*** 
13.620 
(0.154)*** 
13.740 
(0.250)*** 
13.870 
(0.300)*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.36 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.34 
Number of Obs. 720 
Wald Test 
(Comparing with 50th 
Percentile) 
 F =   5.53   
(0.02) 
F = 5.10 
(0.02) 
 F = 0.00 
(0.95) 
F = 0.68  
(041) 
 0.000 
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Table 5 
Interaction Effect and Reduced Samples 
*** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent * Significant at ten percent 
 
Table 6 
Coefficient of Key Covariates and Interaction at Varied Statistic 
Coefficients at Varied Statistic [ standard errors in parenthesis] 
 
Key Covariates Mean 20th Percentile  50th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Interest Rate    - 0.002 (0.005) - 0.024 (0.004)***     0.004 (0.006)       0.014 (0.007)** 
Poverty - 0.525 (0.035)***   - 0.169 (0.135)   - 0.169 (0.136)        0.169 (0.136) 
Interaction - 0.024( 0.004)***   0.021 (0.004)***   - 0.021 (0.004)***      - 0.021 (0.004)*** 
Coefficients & Robust Standard Errors Dependent Variable  
Amount of Current Loan 
Take-up 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
 
Interaction 
Term 
(2) 
 
Poorest 
Sample 
 (3) 
 
Non-Poor 
Sample 
(4) 
 
Impose 
Restrictions 
(5) 
 
Without Interaction 
term and Dummies 
 
Interest rate  
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- 0.044 
(0.009)*** 
0.008 
(0.005) 
- 0.016 
(0.004)*** 
- 0.014 
(0.004)*** 
Client Status  0.221 
(0.079)*** 
0.461 
(0.194)** 
0.170 
(0.088)** 
0.242 
(0.080)*** 
0.315 
(0.078) *** 
Amount of Previous 
Loan 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000) *** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
 
Sex  of  Client  
- 0.181 
(0.066)*** 
0.249 
(0.183) 
- 0.235 
(0.073)*** 
- 0.280 
(0.073)*** 
- 0.180 
(0.067)*** 
 
Poverty Score 
0.525 
(0.035)*** 
0.707 
(0.168)*** 
0.504 
(0.064)*** 
- 0.530 
(0.036)*** 
Number of Savings 
Account 
0.139 
(0.074)** 
0.137 
(0.158) 
0.151 
(0.076)** 
0.204 
(0.077)*** 
0.146 
(0.076)* 
Source of funds 0.361 
(0.091)*** 
0.428 
(0.252)** 
0.390 
(0.105)*** 
0.071 
(0.090) 
0.136 
(0.086) 
 
Household size 
0.032 
(0.014)** 
0.106 
(0.025)*** 
0.011 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.029 
(0.015)* 
 
Location 
1.588 
(0.212)*** 
Dropped 1.534 
(0.213) *** 
1.617 
(0.218)*** 
1.624 
(0.205) *** 
Poor Dummy - - - - 1.055 
(0.099)*** 
- 
Interaction term  
(Pov. Sc. * Int. Rate) 
0.024 
(0.004) *** 
- - 
 
- - 
 
Constant 
13.097 
(0.124)*** 
14.023 
(0.476)*** 
12.860 
(0.236)*** 
14.071 
(0.185)*** 
13.581 
(0.170)*** 
R-Squared 0.50 0.52 0.34 0.42 0.48 
Number of Obs. 698 120 578 698 698 
Ramsey’s Specification 
Test 
F = 4.58  
0.000 
F = 2.41  
0.07 
F = 7.23  
0.000 
F = 1.89  
0.13 
F = 11.21  
(0.000) 
Chow Test 15.26 (0.000) 
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Table 7 
Second Stage Estimations 
Coefficients & Robust Standard Errors Dependent Variable:  
Amount of Current 
Loan Take-up 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) 
 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
 
Instrumental 
Variable 
 (3) 
 
Hausman 
(4a) 
 
Heckman 1. 
 
(4b) 
 
Heckman 2. 
 
Interest rate 
-0.014 
(0.004)*** 
-0.074 
(0.010)*** 
- 0.060 
 
- 0.016 
(0.005)*** 
- 0.013 
(0.005)*** 
 
Client Status 
0.314 
(0.078)*** 
0.206 
(0.088)** 
0.009 
 
0.044 
(0.124) 
- 0.014 
(0.163) 
Number of Savings 
Account 
0.146 
(0.076)** 
0.205 
(0.066)*** 
0.059 
 
0.171 
(0.59)*** 
0.139 
(0.58)** 
Amount of Previous 
Loan 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
 
Poverty Score 
0.530 
(0.036)*** 
0.499 
(0.043)*** 
- 0.031 
 
0.526 
(0.038)*** 
0.537 
(0.039)*** 
 
Location 
1.624 
(0.205)*** 
1.540 
(0.165)*** 
- 0.083 
 
1.534 
(0.150)*** 
1.692 
(0.150)*** 
 
Source of Funds 
0.136 
(0.086) 
  0.555 
(0.015)*** 
0.419 
 
0.235 
(0.105)** 
0.019 
(0.110) 
 
Household size 
0.029 
(0.014)** 
0.031 
(0.024)*** 
  0.002 
 
0.027 
(0.014)** 
0.030 
(0.014)** 
 
Sex  of  Client  
-0.1880 
(0.067)*** 
- 0.259 
(0.076)*** 
-0.079 
 
- 0.297 
(0.079)*** 
- 0.268 
(0.078)*** 
 
Constant 
13.581 
(0.170)*** 
15.252 
(0.319)*** 
- 
 
13.867 
(0.202)*** 
14.047 
(0.270)*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.34    
 
Number of Obs. 
698 698  Censored     -  850 
Uncensored -  698 
Censored  - 1952 
Uncensored - 698 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency 
[Instrument] 
Correlation between  
Operational Self Sufficiency  
and Interest Rate                   -  -  -   -     0.40                     
 
Hausman Test Chi-Square 40.58 (0.00)  
Self   Employed 
[Exclusion Variable]  
0.002 
(0.096) 
 - - 
Heckman - Sigma 
 - 6.49 (0.000) - 5.74 (0.000) 
Heckman - Rho 
  - 2.68 (0.007) - 2.20 (0.028) 
Heckman – Test of   
              Independence 
 5.95 (0.014)          3.18 (0.074) 
   *** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent * Significant at ten percent 
 
